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A PRIMER ON U.S. INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS APPLICABLE TO
MUSIC INFORMATION RETRIEVAL
SYSTEMS
Michael W. Carroll*

[Note to reader: Pagination for this article is accurate, although the
page breaks are sometimes in awkward places due to typeface
constraints.]
Digital technology has had a significant impact on the ways in
which music information can be stored, transmitted, and used. Within
the information sciences, music information retrieval has become an
increasingly important and complex field. This brief article is addressed
primarily to those involved in the design and implementation of systems
for storing and retrieving digital files containing musical notation,
recorded music, and relevant metadata – hereinafter referred to as a
Music Information Retrieval System (“MIRS”). In particular, this group
includes information specialists, software engineers, and the attorneys
who advise them. Although peer-to-peer computer applications, such as
Napster’s MusicShare or the Kazaa Media Desktop, can be conceived of
as creating a MIRS, my analysis focuses on MIRS designed or operated
by an entity that takes responsibility for choosing and controlling the
music information stored in the system. Examples would include digital
music collections stored in research libraries or on university intranets,
as well as commercial systems with similar design features.
This article describes how certain provisions of U. S. intellectual
property law apply to MIRSs and mentions relevant law in the European
Union for purposes of comparison. The focus is on U. S. copyright law,
with very brief mention of U.S. patent and trade secret law. Additionally,
the article mentions proposed legislation for database protection, which
already exists in the European Union. Enactment of such legislation
could be very significant for developers and operators of MIRS.

*
Assistant Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. Thanks go to the anonymous
referee for helpful comments. Any mistakes, of course, remain mine. This Article is licensed under a Creative
Commons Attribution License. See http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/.
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I. COPYRIGHT LAW
Copyright is important to those involved in designing and operating
MIRS for two different reasons. First, copyright law constrains the uses of the
data in MIRS because the law grants creators of data and their assigns
exclusive rights in the music information.1 Designers, and users of MIRS need
permission from the owners of the rights in the music information for many
uses.2 Second, those who build MIRS receive rights from copyright law in the
original selection and arrangement of musical information stored in the MIRS,
as well as in software designed for use in MIRS. For these reasons, the
discussion of copyright covers both rights in musical information and rights in
MIRS.
A. What is Copyrightable?
The U. S. Constitution permits Congress to grant to “authors” exclusive
rights to their respective “writings” for “limited times.”3 As interpreted by the
Supreme Court, this provision gives Congress considerable flexibility in
determining the scope and duration of copyright protection.4
1. Originality
A work must be “original,” meaning that the work must have been
independently created by the author and it must reflect a minimal spark of
creativity.5 In the field of music information, two different copyrightable
works are recognized.
First, the underlying composition, called the “musical work,” is
comprised of the original expression in the music and lyrics.6 Almost all
musical compositions satisfy the originality requirement. Even compositions
that are highly derivative of prior works usually contain some original
material.7 Copyright protection is limited to the original material added by the
composer or publisher.8
1. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 817 (9th Cir. 2003) (“An owner
of a copyright has the exclusive right to reproduce, distribute, and publicly display copies of the work.”).
2. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014, 1022, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001)
(holding users directly liable and Napster contributorily and vicariously liable for the infringement of
copyrights in both musical works and sound recordings).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
4. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 200-04 (2003) (retrospective extension of copyright does
not violate the “limited Times” restriction); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561-62 (1973) (stating
Congress has broad discretion to identify protectible “writings”).
5. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
6. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2000).
7. Cf. Newton v. Diamond, 349 F.3d 591, 594 (9th Cir. 2003) (assuming that a three-note sequence
was a protectable musical work).
8. See Entm’t Research Group v. Genesis Creative Group, 122 F.3d 1211, 1218-19 (9th Cir. 1997)
(“[C]opyright protection afforded to derivative works is more limited than it is for original works of
authorship. Specifically, Section 103(b) provides that the copyright in a derivative work ‘extends only to the
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Second, since 1972, federal law has recognized that original expression
also goes into the recorded version of a musical work.9 The creative decisions
made by the performers, sound engineers, and producers collectively are
captured in the “sound recording” of the musical works.10 Thus, even if a
MIRS comprises only recorded renditions of musical works whose copyright
has expired – say, a collection of Mozart’s works – the orchestra or its
recording company likely owns the copyright in the sound recording of those
musical works that are in the public domain.
It should not be surprising that most music information in MIRS will be
original. However, the generous originality standard also means that the MIRS
itself may constitute one or more original works of authorship. The selection
and arrangement of information in a compilation or collection may be
sufficiently original to be copyrightable.11 The key is whether the judgments
made by the person(s) selecting and arranging the data require the exercise of
sufficient discretion to make the selection or arrangement “original.”12 In Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company, which announced the
originality requirement, the Court held that a white pages telephone directory
could not be copyrighted.13 The data—the telephone numbers and addresses—
were “facts” which were not original because they had no “author.”14 Also, the
selection and arrangement of the facts did not meet the originality requirement
because the decision to alphabetize all the numbers and addresses in a certain
geographic area did not reflect the “minimal spark” of creativity needed.15
The selection and arrangement of music information stored in a MIRS
can be sufficiently original to satisfy copyright law’s requirement. If the other
copyrightability requirements are satisfied, the creator of the MIRS may have a
right to claim infringement against anyone who copies the MIRS database
without authorization. Adding a layer of complexity, original expression in a
MIRS may include the selection and arrangement of the metadata describing
the music information. For example, if the MIRS designer makes sufficiently
original choices about

material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in
the work.”) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1994)); see also Russell v. Price, 612 F.2d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir.
1979).
9. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2), (7) (2000); Agee v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 59 F.3d 317, 322
(2d Cir. 1995) (discussing the legislative history of the sound recording amendment).
10. E.g., Sys. XIX, Inc. v. Parker, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1228 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (citing legislative history
for the proposition that authorship of a sound recording is likely to include the creative contributions of
performers and record producers).
11. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362 (1991).
12. See Id. at 360.
13. Id. at 361.
14. Id. at 361-62.
15. Id. at 362-63.
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how to classify the music information or how to describe the music
information, the metadata may also constitute a copyrightable work.16
To the extent that software is used in a MIRS, software is protectable as a
“literary work.”17 So long as the code reflects the exercise of editorial
discretion, it is protectable. As is discussed below, the scope of protection is
limited.18
2. Fixation
A work must also be “fixed” in any medium permitting the work to be
“perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than
a transitory duration.”19 An original musical composition is not copyrighted
until it is recorded in some way—in musical notation or in a recorded
performance. Sound recordings are by definition recorded and thus are
copyrighted so long as the decisions going into the recording reflect the
requisite originality.20 Finally, the structure and arrangement of a MIRS may
be fixed any time that it is written down or implemented. Fixation of the work
is a momentous occasion for works created after January 1, 1978, because
exclusive rights under copyright shower down upon the creator at the moment
of fixation.21 Previously, rights in published works attached only when
registered and published with notice.22
B. What Rights Does Copyright Grant?
What are the rights that attach to a creator at the moment the work is
fixed? With regard to musical information and MIRS, it depends. The owner
of any copyright has: (1) the right “to reproduce the copyrighted work

16. Copyright protection would not, however, be appropriate is the metadata is not sufficiently original.
For example, metadata that merely identifies the names of composers or performers, dates of composition,
publication, and performance would probably not be sufficiently original, however such data were arranged.
But if the metadata also included information about musical sources that inspired a particular work or
information about other recordings on which performers had played, then the metadata would more likely be
sufficiently original to be copyrightable. An example of a complex metadatabase describing music
information is the community-compilation, MusicBrainz, at http://www.musicbrainz.org (last visited Mar. 5,
2004).
17. Dun & Bradstreet Software Servs. v. Grace Consulting, Inc., 307 F.3d 197, 206 (3d Cir. 2002)
(“Computer programs are entitled to copyright protection as ‘literary works.’”); Computer Mgmt. Assistance
Co. v. Robert F. DeCastro, Inc., 220 F.3d 396, 400 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Computer programs are entitled to
copyright protection.”); see also Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 259 (5th Cir. 1988) (noting
that the Copyright Act was amended in 1976 “to include computer programs in the definition of protectable
literary works”).
18. A caveat for MIRS protection is that when functional considerations essentially dictate the design of
either the data structure or the software, the work will not be deemed original. Functional considerations can
include the decision to adopt an “industry standard” structure. Cf. Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700,
707 (2d Cir. 1991) (explaining and applying merger doctrine).
19. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a) (2000).
20. See, e.g., Staggers v. Real Authentic Sound, 77 F. Supp. 2d 57, 61 n.6 (D.D.C. 1999).
21. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000).
22. See Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 674 n.20 (7th
Cir. 1986); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976).
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in copies or phonorecords;”23 (2) the right “to prepare derivative works based
upon the copyrighted work;”24 and (3) the right “to distribute copies or
phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.”25 In addition the owners of musical
and literary works—which would include software and, potentially, a MIRS
data structure—have (4) the right to perform the copyrighted work publicly26
and (5) the right to display the copyrighted work publicly.27 Sound recordings
have a more limited performance right, which is (6) the right to perform the
copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.28 The
rights in musical information most relevant to the use of a MIRS are the rights
of reproduction, distribution, and performance.
1. Reproduction
The reproduction right covers both exact duplicates of a work and works
that are “substantially similar” to the copyrighted work when it can be shown
that the alleged copyist had access to the copyrighted work.29 Digital
technology has broadened the scope of the reproduction right because
computers necessarily make exact duplicates of data when processing or
transmitting it. The courts have held that even a temporary copy of a
copyrighted work stored in a computer’s random access memory (“RAM”)
exercises the right to reproduce the work.30
Consequently, the operator of a MIRS with digital data must have
permission not only to store a copy of the musical work and/or sound recording
on a hard disk or other similar medium, but also permission to make the copies
that a user will make to view the musical information while stored in RAM and
any copies the user will receive when accessing the MIRS through a computer
network.
Reproductions of sound recordings necessarily involve the reproduction
of the underlying musical work. Thus, in many cases,

23. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2000).
24. Id. § 106(2).
25. Id. § 106(3).
26. Id. § 106(4).
27. Id. § 106(5).
28. Id. § 106(6).
29. See, e.g., Repp v. Webber, 132 F.3d 882, 892 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that the song “Till You” did not
infringe copyright the for the song “Close Every Door”); Benson v. Coca-Cola Co., 795 F.2d 973, 975 (11th
Cir. 1986) (stating that the song “I’d Like to Buy the World a Coke” was an independent creation and did not
infringe on the copyright of the song “Don’t Cha Know”); Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 905 (7th Cir. 1984)
(stating that the plaintiff failed to show that the musical group the Bee Gees had access to plaintiff’s song “Let
It End” before they composed “How Deep Is Your Love”); Tisi v. Patrick, 97 F. Supp. 2d 539, 548 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (stating that the composer failed to show both that the performer had access to “Sell Your Soul” and the
necessary “striking similarity” between the songs).
30. See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993). See generally
Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy Ownership, 42 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1245 (2001) (arguing that ownership of physical copy is a hidden presumption in copyright law that
should be updated with respect to digital copies).
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permission to reproduce both the musical work and the sound recording must
be obtained.
A more vexing question arises with regard to the scope of the
reproduction right with respect to streaming audio files. If a MIRS permits
users to stream audio files without receiving a permanent copy, what rights
must the operator of the MIRS have? Audio streaming involves the making of
temporary buffer copies during transmission. It remains uncertain whether
these copies are sufficiently permanent to implicate the reproduction right.31
The European Union has made explicit that temporary buffer copies do not
implicate the right of reproduction.32
2. Distribution
The distribution right applies to the distribution of copies to the public.
In the off-line world, the distribution right would be the basis for a recording
company’s lawsuit against the sellers of unauthorized recordings. In the digital
context, one could argue that the distribution right does not apply because
computers do not distribute a single copy from point A to point B; instead, they
generate new copies.33 Thus far, the courts have not adopted this interpretation
and have also given the distribution right a broad reading. Some courts,
including the appeals court in the Napster case, have held that merely exposing
an MP3 file to the Internet is a public distribution of the file.34 Consequently,
in any license agreement for the musical information stored in a MIRS, the
operator will need permission to distribute the copyrighted works—the musical
works and the sound recordings (where applicable)—if the system permits
users to download copies.
The harder case would involve systems that permit streaming-only access
to recorded music. If a system operator would need a license to reproduce the
musical information because of the buffer and cache copies made during the
streaming process, then the system operator probably also needs a license to
publicly distribute those evanescent copies.

31. See R. Anthony Reese, Copyright and Internet Music Transmissions: Existing Law, Major
Controversies, Possible Solutions, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 237, 252 (2001). An agreement between the music
publishers and the recording industry treats these ephemeral copies as “copies” requiring a license. Id.
32. See INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF MUSIC PUBLISHERS, SECOND WIPO INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2001), available at
http://ecommerce.wipo.int/meetings/2001/conference/presentations/pdf/vacher.pdf.
33. See, e.g., Michael W. Carroll, Disruptive Technology and Common Law Lawmaking: A Brief
Analysis of A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 9 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 5, 16 n.52 (2002).
34. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001).
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3. Public Performance
With regard to musical information, two different performance rights
apply. For underlying musical works, the copyright owner has the exclusive
right to authorize any public performance, subject to the fair use privilege and
certain statutory exceptions.35 The right of public performance applies
whenever the copyrighted work can be listened to or watched by members of
the public at large, such as during a live performance or recorded performance
made available by broadcast or digital streaming.36 Copyright owners in sound
recordings, by contrast, have an exclusive right only in public performances
done by “digital audio transmission.”37 Digital streaming of an audio file
would be a digital audio transmission of a sound recording. One practical
effect of the distinct performance rights is to treat broadcasters and webcasters
differently—broadcasters need a license only from the composers or publishers
whereas webcasters need a license from both the composers or publishers and
from the sound recording copyright owners. The operators of a MIRS that
permits digital audio streaming of copyrighted musical works or sound
recordings similarly would need licenses from both the composers’
representatives and the sound recording owners’ representatives.
Adding another layer of complexity and uncertainty is the alternative to
applying reproduction and distribution rights to streaming-only audio. In that
case, the question is whether the unambiguous public performance also is a
reproduction and distribution. With respect to MIRS that permit downloading
of audio files, which unambiguously exercise at least the right of reproduction,
arguments have been made that public performance rights also are exercised
because the file often can be listened to as the download takes place.38
4. Public Display
The owner of the copyright in a musical work also has the exclusive right
to publicly display the work.39 To the author’s knowledge, this right has not
been the subject of much dispute or attention because musical works
traditionally have been copied and distributed in sheet music form or have
been performed. The

35. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2000).
36. Id. at § 101; Home Box Office, Inc. v. Corinth Motel, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1186, 1190 (N.D. Miss.
1986) (“Public performance [of copyrighted material] occurs when a work is transmitted with any device to
the public for reception in separate places.”); Entm’t & Sports Programming Network, Inc. v. Edinburg Cmty.
Hotel, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 1334, 1340 (S.D. Tex. 1986) (“A public performance [of a copyrighted work] also
occurs when a work is transmitted with any device to the public for reception in separate places.”).
37. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106(6), 114(j)(5) (2000)
38. See, e.g., Samval Fifer, Changing Horses in Mid-Stream: The Copyright Office’s New Rule Makes
Broadcasters Pay for “Streaming” Their Signals Over the Internet, 3 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 182 (2001).
39. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(5) (2000).
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Internet and other digital networks may increase attention on the display right
because posting a musical score to an online location from which it can be
viewed by the general public almost certainly would be considered a public
display of the work.40 Indeed, because a musical work is defined to include
lyrics, the many Web sites that publish lyrics are likely engaged in the public
display of those musical works. Operators of MIRS that permit online display
of music and/or lyrics should obtain permission to publicly display the musical
work.
5. Prepare Derivative Works
“A ‘derivative work’ is work based upon one or more preexisting works”
that consists of elaborations or modifications that, taken as whole, are
themselves original works of authorship.41 That is, a derivative work has two
characteristics: (1) it incorporates a pre-existing copyrighted work; and (2) it
has sufficiently original modifications to allow for recognition of a new
copyrighted work.42 With regard to music information, some easy examples
are sound recordings (the editorial decisions involved in rendering the musical
work create a new work), musical arrangements (same), and parodies (e.g., the
oeuvre of Weird Al Yankovic is comprised of derivative works). Within the
music industry, the right to make derivative works is implicated most often by
new compositions based on pre-existing compositions (including samples of
prior recordings), sound recordings of pre-existing compositions, and use of
recorded music in audiovisual works, such as movies, television shows, and
advertisements.43
For those who build MIRS, more subtle forms of the derivative works
right may be implicated. If a MIRS designer must make discretionary
decisions in choosing how to translate music information in analog form into
digital form, the MIRS designer may have a “thin” copyright in the digital
version. The same may be said for the decisions involved in translating a work
from one digital format to another. The digital work would be a derivative
work comprised of the underlying

40. Cf. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 817 (9th Cir. 2003) (parties conceded that posting
photographs to an online location implicated both the right of reproduction and right of display).
41. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103, 106(2) (2000).
42. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 223 (1990) (noting that “aspects of a derivative work added by
the derivative author are that author’s property, but the element drawn from the pre-existing work remains on
grant from the owner of the pre-existing work”); see also Russell v. Price, 612 F.2d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir.
1979).
43. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 10, 24 (1979) (holding
that the issuance by ASCAP and BMI of blanket licenses for television networks to use copyrighted musical
works is not per se unlawful under antitrust laws); Newton v. Diamond, 349 F.3d 591, 597-98 (9th Cir. 2003)
(The Beastie Boys did not exceed the scope of their license to “sample” plaintiff’s composition.); Carte v
Evans, 27 F. 861, 864-65 (C.C.D. Mass. 1886) (Piano-forte arrangement of an opera orchestral score is an
original musical composition and subject to copyright.).
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copyrighted work and the new work embodied in the digital object. This
“thin” copyrighted work would be similar to the copyright claimed by those
who reformat movies to be shown on television.44 The copyright is “thin”
because it is limited to that particular form of digitization and can be asserted
against only those who copy that particular form of digitization.45 This right
could have economic importance if, for example, a competitor copied digital
files of public domain sound recordings from a MIRS. The only potential
copyright claimant in such a case would be the MIRS designer. To create such
a derivative work, however, the decisions involved in translating the
copyrighted work would have to be more involved than the mere choice to
encode a file in .mp3 format rather than .wav format.
The derivative works right also could be implicated if a MIRS were
designed so as to permit users to edit or rearrange musical works or sound
recordings. Were that possible, the user could be directly liable for exercising
the derivative works right without authorization. The MIRS designer or
operator, however, could also be held liable under theories of third-party
liability for copyright infringement discussed immediately below.
C. Theories of Third Party Liability
Those who build or operate MIRS also have to be aware of theories of
third party liability that could be asserted against them if their systems or
software enable others to infringe copyrights. Music publishers and record
labels have asserted these theories against Napster and other developers of
peer-to-peer networking software.46
1. Contributory Infringement
To contributorily infringe a copyright, one must (1) have actual or
constructive knowledge of the direct infringer’s infringing conduct; and (2)
substantially participate in, or materially contribute to, the infringing
conduct.47 For builders or operators of MIRS, the second requirement likely
will be met when the MIRS is used to accomplish the infringement.
The harder question will be under what conditions the manufacturer or
operator of a MIRS knows, or should know, that users are engaged in
infringing conduct? Evidence of actual knowledge would

44. See, e.g., Maljack Prods., Inc. v. UAV Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1416, 1426-28 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (finding
sufficient originality in pan-and-scan reformatting of public domain film for television to create copyrighted
work in edited version).
45. See generally Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 812 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[A] thin copyright . . . protects
against only virtually identical copying.”).
46. See, e.g., In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding a preliminary
injunction against the distribution of Aimster software and the operation of the Aimster system).
47. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001).
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include discovering infringing conduct and then doing nothing to stop it.48
Constructive knowledge could be shown when a reasonable person is aware of
facts causing the person to inquire further as to whether infringement was
occurring in connection with the MIRS, or when the facts would lead a
reasonable person to infer in specific instances that the MIRS was being used
for infringement of copyrights.
One defense available to the manufacturer of a MIRS that can respond to
an allegation of infringing conduct is the so-called Sony defense, announced by
the Supreme Court in Sony Corporation v. Universal City Studios, Inc.49
There, the Court did not impose contributory liability on the manufacturers of
VCRs for infringing copies of television shows made by VCR owners.50 This
defense articulates the common-sense reasoning that we do not hold the
manufacturers of photocopiers liable when users make infringing copies of
books or sheet music, even though the manufacturers know that this is one
likely use of the technology.51 Under the Sony defense, the manufacturer of a
technology that can be put to infringing use cannot be held to have constructive
knowledge of infringement and, therefore, cannot be held liable for
contributory infringement as long as the technology is capable of “substantial
non-infringing uses.”52
2. Vicarious Liability for Copyright Infringement
Vicarious liability will apply whenever (1) one has control or supervisory
power over the direct infringer’s infringing conduct and (2) one receives a
direct financial benefit from the infringing conduct.53 Recent cases have
expanded the scope of this kind of liability. In the Napster case, the court held
that Napster had control over its users because it could refuse them access to
the Napster server and, pursuant to the Terms of Service Agreements entered
into with users, could terminate access if infringing conduct was discovered.54
Other courts have required a greater showing of actual control over the
infringing conduct,55 but operators of MIRS should be aware that by merely
asserting contractual rights to terminate access to the MIRS for infringing
conduct may be sufficient to satisfy the control requirement.56

48. See id. at 1022 n.6 (stating that Napster executives had actual knowledge of users’ infringing
conduct).
49. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
50. Id.
51. See In re Aimster, 334 F.3d at 650-51.
52. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020-22.
53. Id. at 1022.
54. Id. at 1023-24.
55. See, e.g., Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 437 n.18.
56. For an extended discussion and criticism of the expansive view of control, see Carroll, supra note
33, at 25-29.
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Similarly, a direct financial benefit is not limited to a share of the
infringer’s profits. The Napster court held that Napster received a direct
financial benefit from infringing file trading because users’ ability to obtain
infringing audio files drew them to the service. Additionally, Napster could
potentially receive a financial benefit from having attracted a larger user base
to the service.57
D. How Long Does Copyright Last?
Use of most MIRS will involve the exercise of some of the rights of
copyright owners. Therefore, the operator of a MIRS will need a license to
exercise those rights unless the music information is in the public domain.
Determining whether music information contained in a MIRS is under
copyright protection will not be an easy task.58 The only hard and fast rule is
that musical works—that is, musical scores—are in the public domain in the
United States if they were published prior to 1923.59
Regrettably, the same cannot be said for early recorded music. Sound
recordings were not protected by federal copyright until 1972.60 These
recordings cannot truly be considered to be in the public domain, however,
because a number of states have anti-bootlegging laws that apply to the
unauthorized sale or distribution of sound recordings. These laws are not
consistent. Some limit the claim to those who seek to profit from the sale or
rental of sound recordings, others provide express exemptions for non-profit
institutions, and some place time limits on protection.61 Federal law will not
preempt the effect of these state laws until 2067.62 Thus, even when the
underlying musical work—say a Scott Joplin rag—has entered the public
domain, early recordings of that work have not. This is in stark contrast to the
approach taken in the European

57. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1023.
58. See Lolly Gasaway, When U.S. Works Pass Into the Public Domain, at
http://www.unc.edu/~unclng/public-d.htm (last updated Nov. 14, 2003) (showing a helpful chart for
determining when works pass into the public domain).
59. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, EXTENSION OF COPYRIGHT TERMS (2003), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ15t.pdf (“Works published before January 1, 1923 have fallen into the
public domain . . . .”). If the data in a MIRS consist solely of digital copies of public domain sheet music, the
copyright status of the musical works still must be investigated. Some publishers of public domain
compositions claim they have added original material in the arrangement or in the way that they typeset or
otherwise present the composition. See Life Music, Inc. v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 31 F.R.D. 3, 19 (S.D.N.Y.
1962). In many cases these are dubious claims.
60. See, e.g., Robert W. Clarida, Pre-1972 Sound Recordings, LEGAL LANGUAGE SERV., at
http://www.legallanguage.com/lawarticles/Clarida007.html (Dec. 2000) (describing copyright issues
surrounding the ownership, duration, and restoration of sound recordings first fixed before February 15, 1972).
61. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 653h(a) (1999) (requiring that use of early recorded sounds must be
for profit to be actionable.); FLA. STAT. ch. 540.11(6)(c) (2002) (providing express exemption for non-profit
institutions); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-601 (1999) (Rights to pre-1972 sound recordings are defined in terms
of a “common law copyright” which expires after fifty-six years. So, as of January 1, 2004, sound recordings
made on or before December 31, 1947 were recognized by the State of Colorado as public domain.).
62. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (2000).
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Union63—which generally has a more protective copyright regime—where
sound recordings enter the public domain 50 years after publication.64 The
effect of this provision is becoming more pronounced as popular music from
the 1950s begins to enter the public domain in Europe.65
For post-1923 musical works and post-1972 sound recordings, measuring
the length of copyright requires knowing whether the author is a known
individual or the creator’s employer, whether the work was created before or
after January 1, 1978, and if created before 1978, whether the work was
published.66 Works created after 1978 are under copyright for the life of the
author plus 70 years. If the work was created as a “work made for hire,” the
term is 95 years from the date of publication or 120 years from the date of
creation if not published.
Prior to 1978, copyright lasted for one term of twenty-eight years, which
could be renewed for another twenty-eight years. A work published prior to
1978 will be in the public domain if it was published without a copyright
notice. Alternatively, if a work published before 1978 did not have its
copyright renewed, it is in the public domain. Otherwise, for works still under
copyright on January 1, 1978, the term of copyright is effectively ninety-five
years from the date the copyright was secured.
E. Ownership and Transfer of Copyright
Most of the music information in a MIRS will be copyrighted and almost
all MIRS will exercise at least some of the copyright owners’ rights.
Consequently, creators and operators of MIRS will likely need to seek
permission to use the copyrighted music information. From whom does one
seek permission?
As a practical matter, in most cases, licenses should be sought from the
music publisher for musical works and from the recording company for sound
recordings. If a MIRS includes the ability to stream audio works to the public,
performance licenses will be required.67 For the

63. Council Decision 2000/278, art. 1, 2000 O.J. (L89) 2 (adopting treaty by European Community).
64. See World Intellectual Property Organization: Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1997,
art. 17, 36 I.L.M. 76.
65. As of February 2004, Congress was considering proposed responses to this discrepancy in copyright
protection, to protect American copyright owners from the European public domain. See Piracy Deterrence
and Education Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 2517 Before the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and
Intellectual Property of the Committee on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) (proposing to amend federal
copyright law to prohibit importation of sound recordings which have entered the public domain under the
European standard, but which are still under copyright in the United States).
66. See, e.g., Richard D. Rose, Connecting the Dots: Navigating the Laws and Licensing Requirements
of the Internet Music Revolution, 42 IDEA 313, 327 (2002) (providing a helpful chart of copyright status of
sound recordings by date of fixation and publication).
67. See, e.g., Reese, supra note 31, at 244-45.
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musical works, these licenses can be obtained from the following performing
rights organizations: The American Society of Composers, Authors and
Publishers (ASCAP),68 Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI),69 and SESAC, Inc.
(formerly the Society of European State Authors and Composers).70 Licenses
for sound recordings can currently be obtained from SoundExchange.71
However, the U.S. Copyright Office has received petitions to allow other
performing rights organizations to also play this role.72
As a background matter, copyrights vest initially with the author(s).73 For
musical works, this will usually be the composer(s). Sound recordings often
have multiple authors, so tracing the rights can be quite complex. Under the
“work made for hire” doctrine, the employer will be treated as the author when
the work was created by an employee acting within the scope of employment,
or by an independent contractor when there has been a written agreement and
the work falls within one of nine classes.74
Copyrights are transferable by contract.75 Under standard business
practices within the music industry, composers transfer the rights in their
compositions to the publisher, and those involved in the creation of sound
recordings transfer their rights to the record label.76 Some powerful artists
retain their copyrights, and in these cases licenses must be obtained from the
artists’ representatives.
II. LEGAL PROTECTION OF DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) creates an obligation
to respect the technological protection that a copyright owner has placed on
copies of his or her work.77 For those who own or operate MIRS, these
provisions require the MIRS not to circumvent technological controls that limit
access or the ability to exercise one of the exclusive rights—such as the right
to make copies—attached to the musical information within the MIRS.78
Additionally, the MIRS must

68. THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF COMPOSERS, AUTHORS AND PUBLISHERS, ASCAP INTEREST LICENSE
AGREEMENT, at http://www.ascap.com/weblicense (last visited Mar. 3, 2004).
69. BMI, DIGITAL LICENSING CENTER, at https://dlc.bmi.com/dlcmenu.asp (last visited Mar. 3, 2004).
70. SESAC, LICENSING, at http://www.sesac.com/licensing/licensing1.asp (last visited Mar. 3, 2004).
71. See SoundExchange, at http://soundexchange.com (last visited Mar. 3, 2004); U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFFICE, WEBCASTING RATES, at http://www.copyright.gov/carp/webcasting_rates.html (last visited Mar. 3,
2004) [hereinafter WEBCASTING RATES].
72. WEBCASTING RATES, supra note 71.
73. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000).
74. See id. §§ 101, 201(b).
75. See id. § 204(a).
76. See M. WILLIAM KRASILOVSKY & SIDNEY SHEMEL, THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC, 293-305 (8th ed.
2000).
77. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 441 (2d Cir. 2001).
78. Id. at 440.
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not remove or alter “copyright management information” which could include
information identifying the artist and/or publisher of a musical work or sound
recording.79 These provisions also provide protection to the owner or operator
of a MIRS against unauthorized access to technologically protected,
copyrightable MIRS.
Section 1201 of the DMCA creates three claims that a copyright owner
can make with regard to access and copy control technologies: (1)
unauthorized circumvention of a “technological measure that effectively
controls access” to a copyrighted work; (2) unauthorized manufacture or
trafficking in a technology that circumvents a copyright owner’s access control
technology; and (3) unauthorized manufacture or trafficking in a technology
that circumvents a copyright owner’s technology that protects one of the
owner’s exclusive rights.80 The copyright owner’s technology “effectively
controls access” if the technology requires the application of information (such
as a password), application of a process, or treatment in order to acquire access
to a copy of the work.81 A person or a technology “circumvent[s] a
technological measure” by descrambling, decrypting, or otherwise bypassing,
removing, deactivating, or impairing the copyright owner’s technology.82
Some limited exemptions from these claims exist for non-profit libraries,
archives, and educational institutions; for law enforcement and intelligencegathering agencies; those who reverse engineer computer programs; those
doing research on encryption; those doing security testing; and those who
circumvent access controls that gather personally identifiable information.83
Section 1202 of the DMCA sets forth a series of obligations to ensure the
integrity of so-called “copyright management information,” which the
copyright owner has associated with the copyrighted work.84 The simplest
example of such information would be a copyright notice, but the statute also
includes information identifying the composer, performer, and/or the copyright
owner, as well as any “terms and conditions for use of the work” within the
definition of “copyright management information.”85 Section 1202 creates a
cause of action against someone who makes copies but removes the notice.86
Digital file formats permit far more extensive forms of metadata to be
associated

79. See 17 U.S.C. § 1202 (2000).
80. Id. §§ 1201(a), (b).
81. Id. § 1201(a)(3)(B).
82. See id. § 1201(a)(3)(A); see also Corley, 273 F.3d at 441.
83. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(d)-(j) (2000).
84. See id. § 1202(b) (prohibiting the removal or alteration of copyright management information); see
also id. § 1202(c) (defining “copyright management information” as including nearly all “information
conveyed in connection with copies or phonorecords of a work or performances or displays of a work,
including in digital form, except that such term does not include any personally identifying information about a
user of a work or of a copy, phonorecord, performance, or display of a work”).
85. See id. § 1202(c).
86. See id. § 1202(b)(1).
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with copyrighted works. Section 1202 gives the copyright owner a basis for
insisting that this information be replicated in all copies of the work and for
pursuing those who associate false metadata with the music information.87
III. PATENT AND TRADE SECRET
If an invention is novel, non-obvious, and useful, it is patentable in the
United States.88 Patentable inventions include not only new and useful things
(i.e. end products), but also new and useful processes or methods. Judicial
decisions in the late 1990s have greatly broadened the scope of patent
coverage, particularly with respect to software and methods of doing
business.89 As a result, developers of MIRS or software used in MIRS should
investigate whether the processes embodied in their software infringe an
existing patent or are themselves patentable. Obtaining a patent (or
“prosecuting” a patent) can be an expensive endeavor. A defensive maneuver
for software developers, for whom patent protection is not cost-justified, is to
publish a description of their novel and non-obvious processes. By making the
invention public, a developer reduces the risk that another party will claim
patent protection for the developer’s invention.
In the European Union, software patents have been more difficult to
obtain, although about 30,000 such patents have been issued.90 In the wake of
considerable controversy,91 the European Parliament has adopted an amended
directive restricting the patentability of software.92
The downside of publication is the forfeiture of trade secret protection.
Trade secrets are protected by state law in the United States.93 A trade secret is
usually defined as information that derives actual or potential economic value
from not being generally known or readily ascertainable and is subject to
reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy.94 Trade secret protection for
software embodying trade secrets remains in place as long as the software is
released to the public in object

87. See id. §§ 1202(a), (b).
88. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2000).
89. See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Excel Comm., Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999); State St. Bank &
Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
90. FFII: Software Patents in Europe, at http://swpat.ffii.org (last visited Mar. 5, 2004).
91. The proposed directive has been very controversial. See, e.g., Matthew Broersma, Patent Battle to
Culminate in Brussels, CNET News.com, at http://news.com.com/2100-1012_3-5068007.html (Aug. 26,
2003).
92. See FFII: Software Patents in Europe, Europarl 2003-09-24: Amended Software Patent Directive, at
http://swpat.ffii.org/papers/europarl0309 (last visited Mar. 5, 2004).
93. See MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 2:3 (2003); Christopher Rebel J. Pace, The Case for a
Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 427, 429-35 (1995). Although state law is the source,
protection is fairly uniform because most jurisdictions have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. THE
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, A FEW FACTS ABOUT THE UNIFORM
TRADE SECRETS ACT, at http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-utsa.asp (last
visited Mar. 5, 2004).
94. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1985).
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code form.95 However, reverse engineering generally is not regarded as theft
of a trade secret,96 and if a party reverse engineers such software and publicly
discloses the trade secret(s) contained therein, the information is no longer a
protected trade secret.
IV. DATABASE PROTECTION
The European Union has created a distinct right in otherwise
uncopyrightable databases,97 and proposals to create a similar right in the
United States have been considered by Congress over the past six years or so.
Creation of such a right could have a significant impact on those who design,
operate, and use MIRS. Many databases include information from other
databases, and a right of protection for databases could cause the need for far
more extensive licensing of current practices. As of this writing, Congress is
considering proposed legislation that would provide protection from
misappropriation likely to harm the market for those databases requiring
substantial investments to create or maintain.98
With respect to MIRS, the effect of database legislation would be to
protect even factual music information, such as bibliographic or other
metadata. For example, a complete bibliography or discography of a particular
artist arranged in alphabetical or chronological order probably would not be an
original work of authorship protected by copyright. However, under the
proposed legislation, such a collection of information would be protected.
V. CONCLUSION
Intellectual property law in the United States is designed to provide
incentives for investments of time, energy and financial resources in
innovation. Necessary trade-offs are made between the rights of innovators,
follow-on innovators, and users. In the field of music information, the
multiplicity of rights holders and licensing agents makes costly the aggregation
of necessary rights to build or operate a MIRS. Those who build MIRS also
should be aware of their own rights bestowed under U.S. intellectual property
law.

95. See Stargate Software Int’l, Inc. v. Rumph, 482 S.E.2d 498, 502 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (the term
“trade secret” applies to data or a program); Jostens, Inc. v. Nat’l Computer Sys., Inc., 318 N.W.2d 691, 698
(Minn. 1982) (“unique principles, engineering, logic and coherence in computer software may be accorded
trade secret status”).
96. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2) (comments) (1985).
97. Council Directive 96/9, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20.
98. See generally Database and Collections of Information Misappropriation Act, H.R. 3261, 108th
Cong. (2003) (provides civil liability, subject to exceptions, for those who misappropriate information
contained in another’s database).

